Analogia e Equidade. Normas imperativas jus cogens. Soft Law. Acordos executivos. Conflito entre fontes. Meios jurisdicionais. Meios judiciais. Outros tribunais internacionais. Direito comparado. Controle de armas.
Tratados de direitos humanos ratificados pelo Brasil. Conselho de Direitos Humanos. Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos. Direito Internacional dos Refugiados. Tribunais internacionais penais. A Threat to Latin Democracy Another Latin American democracy is on the verge of crumbling under pressure from leftist populism. The trouble comes this time in Bolivia, where a democratic president and Congress face a paralyzing mix of strikes and roadblocks by a radical movement opposed to foreign investment and free-market capitalism.
The insurgents, who claim to represent the country's indigenous population, drove one democratically elected president from office 18 months ago; now they are working on his successor, Carlos Mesa, who has searched valiantly but unsuccessfully for compromise. The populists ride a leftist wave of momentum in Latin America and have the rhetorical, and possibly material, support of the region's self-styled "Bolivarian" revolutionary, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
The democrats could use some outside help, from their neighbors and the United States. Accounts of political crises in Andean countries such as Bolivia sometimes portray a poor and disenfranchised indigenous majority pitted against an ethnically European and mestizo elite. The facts tell a different story in Bolivia. Mesa, polls show, has the support of two-thirds of his compatriots, while the party leading the protests, the Movement Toward Socialism, has never received more than 21 percent of the vote in an election.
Nor is it the case that Bolivia's experiment with free-market policies in the s failed to help the poor. Per capita incomes rose by 20 percent in the second half of the decade. Thanks to private foreign investment, significantly more Bolivians gained access to water, sewage systems and electricity. The populist minority, led by former coca farmer Evo Morales, is bent on using force to reverse that progress. Already it has effectively blocked natural gas exports to the United States.
Its current strikes are aimed at stopping further foreign investment in that industry through confiscatory taxes and reversing the privatization of other industries. Last week, in desperation, he proposed that his own term as president be cut short and new elections be held in August; Congress rejected the proposal, and Mr.
Mesa later announced he would stay on. But the opposition still threatens to renew a blockade that is devastating one of the hemisphere's poorest economies and prompting talk of secession in Bolivia's relatively prosperous and pro-capitalist eastern provinces. All of this is good news for Mr. Chavez, who along with Cuba's Fidel Castro dreams of a new bloc of Latin "socialist" i.
Bolivia's neighbors, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile, ought to be alarmed by this trend; but though their own leftist governments have expressed support for Mr. Mesa they have refrained from more concerted action -- such as demanding that Mr. Chavez cease his meddling. The State Department issued a statement last week expressing "support for the people of Bolivia and a peaceful democratic process.
The prize, however, never came, unless the active support or vehement defense of autocratic regimes in the region was the kind of compensation envisaged by American leaders. According to the views expressed in many books and articles by the Brazilian historian of international relations Moniz Bandeira, the main concern of the United States policy towards the subcontinent has always been to prevent the emergence of any alternative to its own hegemony over the region.
Thus, the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil has often been stimulated, along with actions designed to create a balance between the two countries and also to prevent their possible alliance. One of the most important reasons for the historical delay of South American integration is that the projects could not be carried on in a non-democratic environment.
Dictatorships such as those which prevailed in South america tend to be impervious to popular demands and to create false antagonisms with neighbouring States, as one of the means to justify the regimes.
But profit is not necessarily the only concern regarding the institutional crises experienced by several South American countries during the past decade. A society submitted to conditions of extreme poverty and extensive use of violence will inevitably become clustered, closed into itself and resistan to agreements with foreign nations.
The decision-making process inherent to autocratic regimes compromises the plans for South American integration. Inasmuch as they represent threats to democracy, the social and economical crises currently taking place in South American countries should be regarded as a matter of extreme relevance by any conutry committed to the integration process. Therefore, collective action must be taken by other countries, respecting the limits posed by national sovereignty, in order to prevent shifts to dictatorship.
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote as follows in his classic book Democracy in America, defining a problem of democratic governance that is as old as the Greeks: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.
A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. Public awareness has increased and the media are far more intrusive. But neither has kept pace with the growing complexity of foreign policy issues. How few of them, though, know or can know enough to form an opinion on the issue?
The dilemma persists because it is inherent in a democracy — the volatility and power of public opinion and the weaknesses of democratic leadership. Not seldom, the preference of the majority is at odds with the requirements of sound policy, domestic or foreign. Not seldom an issue of foreign policy arouses the people from the slumber that is the norm, to shake them with paroxyms of moral outrage.
Few are the leaders who have the moral fibre, the political skill and the intellectual muscle required to explain such realities to them. Having ignored the rumblings, most opt for mere survival when the crisis bursts into the open. Hans J. Morgenthau traces the dilemma to its roots — the statesman, as distinct from the common politician, has to reckon with considerations which the populace cannot grasp. The popular mind reasons in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil.
The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great advantages; he must be able to temporise, to compromise, to bide his time.
The popular mind wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage. By a psychological paradox, the most vociferous and compromising representatives of what is least conducive to the successful conduct of foreign policy are generally politicians who in their own constituencies would not dream of acting the way they expect the framers of foreign policy to act The daily routine of their political lives is devoid of those moral and intellectual qualities which they really admire, which to the public they pretend to possess, and which they wish they were able to practise One is simply to sail with the wind of public opinion and treat public opinion polls as the supreme guide.
A British diplomat, Lord Vansittart, sharply defined this age-old problem: "How to induce the unwilling to accept the unavoidable. The leader whips up the people to a frenzy of chauvinism and defends his intransigence as obedience to the people's will.
The last option is to practise deception. Adapted from A. Noorani's "Of diplomacy and democracy. Ever the perfectionist, Leonardo turned to science in the quest to improve his artwork. His study of nature and anatomy emerged in his stunningly realistic paintings, and his dissections of the human body paved the way for remarkably accurate figures.
The eye, he believed, was the perfect instrument for learning these laws, and the artist the perfect person to illustrate them. Leonardo the scientist bridged the gap between the shockingly unscientific medieval methods and our own trusty modern approach. His experiments in anatomy and the study of fluids, for example, absolutely blew away the accomplishments of his predecessors. Beginning with his first stay in Milan and gathering pace around , Leonardo became more and more wrapped up in his scientific investigations.
The sheer range of topics that came under his inquiry is staggering: anatomy, zoology, botany, geology, optics, aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, among others. As his curiosity took him in ever wilder directions, Leonardo always used this method of scientific inquiry: close observation, repeated testing of the observation, precise illustration of the subject, object or phenomenon with brief explanatory notes. The result was volumes of remarkable notes on an amazing variety of topics, from the nature of the sun, moon and stars to the formation of fossils and, perhaps most notably, the mysteries of flight.
Artists have always found it difficult to make a living off their art. And even a master like Leonardo was forced to sell out in order to support himself. So he adapted his drawing skills to the more lucrative fields of architecture, military engineering, canal building and weapons design. Although a peacenik at heart, Leonardo landed a job working for the Duke of Milan by calling himself a military engineer and outlining some of his sinister ideas for weapons and fortifications.
Like many art school types in search of a salary, he only briefly mentioned to the Duke that he could paint as well. Lucky for Leonardo, he was actually really talented as an engineer. Good illustrators were a dime a dozen in Renaissance Italy, but Leonardo had the brains and the diligence to break new ground, usually leaving his contemporaries in the dust.
When a beaver builds a dam, it doesn't ask itself why it does so, or whether there is a better way of doing it. When a swallow flies south, it doesn't wonder why it is hotter in Africa or what would happen if it flew still further south. Humans do ask themselves these and many other kinds of questions — questions that have no relevance, indeed make little sense, in the context of evolved needs and goals. What marks out humans is our capacity to go beyond our naturally defined goals — such as the need to find food, shelter or a mate — and to establish human-created goals.
Our evolutionary heritage certainly shapes the way that humans approach the world. But it does not limit it. Similarly, our cultural heritage influences the ways in which we think about the world and the kinds of questions we ask of it, but it does not imprison them.
If membership of a particular culture absolutely shaped our worldview, then historical change would never be possible. If the people of medieval Europe had been totally determined by the worldview sustained by medieval European culture, it would not have been possible for that society to have become anything different.
It would not have been possible, for instance, to have developed new ideas about individualism and materialism, or to have created new forms of technology and new political institutions. Human beings are not automata who simply respond blindly to whatever culture in which they find themselves, any more than they are automata that blindly respond to their evolutionary heritage.
There is a tension between the way a culture shapes individuals within its purview and the way that those individuals respond to that culture, just as there is a tension between the way natural selection shapes the way that humans think about the world and the way that humans respond to our natural heritage. This tension allows people to think critically and imaginatively, and to look beyond a particular culture's horizons.
In the six million years since the human and chimpanzee lines first diverged on either side of Africa's Great Rift Valley, the behaviour and lifestyles of chimpanzees have barely changed. Human behaviour and lifestyles clearly have. Humans have learned to learn from previous generations, to improve upon their work, and to establish a momentum to human life and culture that has taken us from cave art to quantum physics — and to the unravelling of the genome.
It is this capacity for constant innovation that distinguishes humans from all other animals. All animals have an evolutionary past. Only humans make history. The historical, transformative quality of being human is why the so-called nature-nurture debate, while creating considerable friction, has thrown little light on what it means to be human. To understand human freedom we need to understand not so much whether we are creatures of nature or nurture, but how, despite being shaped by both nature and nurture, we are also able to transcend both.
In fact, they are based on a non-linearity that tends to facilitate a more associative way of organizing information, e. It is also true that new technologies tend to be global and not focused — that is, they influence more than one sense.
A good example of this is the acoustic virtual environments which are much stronger than a visual experience. A visual experience tacitly distances you, places you in a transcendent, removed position, rather than embodying you at the center of a new context. Marshall McLuhan was right in predicting that the change from mechanic technologies to electronic, digital technologies would create a new culture that more resembles ancient oral cultures than the recent visual, print culture.
What a country calls its vital economic interests are not the things which enable its citizens to live, but the things which enable it to make war. Simone Weil in: W. Auden, A Certain World. It begins — and this is often forgotten — with war, the father of all things. It was war, time and again pushing up the expenses of governments, that fostered the development of modern systems of taxation. For most of history, men lived in warfare states, not welfare states.
Those who prefer their political history to be finance-free need to remember that it was in large measure the quest for taxation that led to the spread of representative government. And as many states have sought to increase the taxation they exact, so they have found it hard to refuse a concomitant widening of political representation. A case in point was the great democratisation that occurred after the First World War, which can be understood as the political price for high wartime sacrifices.
Money does not make the world go round, but it establishes the framework — the cage, if you like — within which we live our lives. Juan Pedro Rojas. Thalisson Maia. Viviane Barbosa. Pedro Henrique Barros Silverio. Paulo Cesar Junior. Emilia Gomes Barbosa Barbosa. Paulo Reis. Milena Katharina. Marcelo Alves Da Silva.
Rodrigo Lameiras. Rafae L Sais. Rossana Cintra. Mais de Marina Kennedy. Marina Kennedy. Igor Pinheiro. Cristiane Reis. Marcos Paulo Arantes Ferro. Manuel Guilherme. Wagner Ribeiro. Populares em Violence. Maik James. Renan Zampilis. Marlene Esmeralda Gomes Andrade. Dermeval Junior.
Sanzer Caldas Moutinho. Mariza Minozzo. Simone Ribeiro.
0コメント